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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL HOFFMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, 
Defendant and Respondent.: 
Supreme Court No. 18184 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In the brief submitted by the respondent, it is suggested 
that the trial court made a factual finding concerning the mental 
state of Louis Hoffman at the time of his death. This assertion 
is contrary to the record, which contains no such finding, and is 
a somewhat disingenuous suggestion to be made by the party who pre-
pared the findings of fact, in accordance with the rules of practice 
in the district courts, which omitted any reference to Mr. Hoffman's 
mental condition.. Clearly, however, the only finding which could 
be supported by the evidence would be that Louis Hoffman was insane 
at the time he received his fatal injuries. 
Dr. Robert Mohr, who respondent acknowledges to have been the 
only witness offering testimony on this subject, repeatedly indica-
ted that Mr. Hoffman was suffering from acute mental illness. In 
addition to those opinions set forth in appellant's previous brief, 
Dr. Mohr testified on cross-examination that from the first time 
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he saw Mr. Hoffman, within a week of his death, he "felt very 
strongly that I needed t~ get him into the hospital" due to his 
mental illness which "was really a psychiatric malignancy .. " (R. 121) 
He testified that he made special arrangements to meet with Mr. 
Hoffman because 
As ill as the man was, my goal all the 
time was to get his confidence and you 
know - you can't predict when you're 
going to say something or something will 
happen for just a moment, he would con-
sider going into the hospital; and if 
that moment did occur I wanted to be 
available to him. (Ro 123) 
Dr., Mohr diagnosed acute high paranoia, which "is a delusional 
state really of an inflammatory nature. . e " (R. 124). When defense 
counsel asked if Mr. Hoffman was a classic high paranoid, the Doctor 
said, "Yes, in the acute, these things just pop out -- just almost 
run rampant. That~·s the way he was" (R. 125). Finally, in response 
to the specific question from defense counsel as to whether Dr. Mohr 
felt Mr. Hoffman was mentally ill on the date of his death, Dr. Mohr 
indicated that he "considered him suicidal, homicidal and a very 
sick man." (R. 126) 
In the face of this uncontradicted testimony, there can be no 
question what finding would have been mandated had the defendant 
chosen to address that issue in the findings of fact submitted. 
However, that issue was not addressed because of the defendant's oft 
repeated contention that Mr. Hoffman's insanity was irrelevant to 
.• 
.l. 
the legal conclusion regarding whether or not his death was acciden- ~ 
tal within the meaning of the insurance policy in question. The 
defendant has repeatedly argued that such a determination must be t 
-2-
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made on an "objective" basis, without regard to the mental condi-
tion of the insured. Th' is assertion is, however, without any 
support in the case law deali'ng wi'th 1 
menta ly ill victims of inten-
tional acts of others. Th 1 
e on y authority cited by defendant in 
support of disregarding the mental illness of the insured is 
_Carlyle v. Equity Bet1efit Life Tns. Co., 551 P.2d 663 (Okla. App. 
1976), which case did not concern a mentally impaired insured or 
raise that issue in any manner and where the Court expressly condi-
tions its holding upon the privi so that in making determinations about 
accidents the Court doesn't 
attempt to state any hard-and-fast rules 
to be applied in making such a determina-
tion-. Each decision • . • must depend 
upon an analysis of the particular facts 
and circumstances. 
551 P.2d at 667. In the instant ca.se, where the facts show conclu-
sively that the insured was fatally injured at a time when he was 
suffering from an acute mental impairment, there is no justifica-
tion for applying the "objective" standard which other courts con-
sidering the issue have uniformly rejected. 
While the defendant insists that determining what constitutes 
an accident on the basis of subjective factors would constitute a 
judicial revision of the policy in question, it can't be denied 
that interpretation of contracts is a proper judicial function and 
the Supreme Court of the State from which the policy was issued has 
previously found that the policy in question provides coverage in 
this situation. See Mohn v. American Cas. Co., 458 Pa. 576, 326 
A.2d 346 (1974); Wetzel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 393 A.2d 
470 (Pa. 1978). 
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The facts of this case present an unusual question concerning 
the responsibility of a mentally impaired insured for the conse-
quences of his actions which might, in a normal individual, be 
deemed probable and forseeable. Where, as in the instant case, the 
insured lacks the capacity to anticipate the probable consequences 
of his actions, the usual definition of accident becomes ambiguous. 
This Court has noted that in cases of ambiguity in insurance con-
tracts any doubt should be resolved in favor of coverage. See 
American Cas. Co. v .· Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd., 568 P. 2d 7 31 (1977). 
Application of this simple principle mandates the conclusion, con-
sistent with those reached in every reported case presenting the 
issue, that an insane insured who suffers injuries intentionally 
inflicted by another has suffered accidental injury as that term 
is used in insurance policies. 
CONCLUSTON 
While the trial court did not feel it necessary to make a 
finding on the question, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that ~ 
Louis Hoffman was suffering from serious mental illness when he was ~~~ 
shot and killed by Salt Lake City Police Officers. Because this 
insanity prevented Mr. Hoffman from making rational judgments about 
the probable consequences of his_conduct, his resultant injury and 
death was accidental within the meaning of that term when used in 
a policy of insurance. In so holding, this Court would not be 
creating a new definition of accident, but merely recognizing that 
the peculiar facts of this case mandate a different result than 
might otherwise be reached if Mr. Hoffman had acted without the 
encumbrance of severe mental illness. As this Court has previously 
noted: 
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~ac~ ~ndividual may be considered the average 
individual unless the facts disclose that in 
reality he is not; and when the facts do so 
show, then the question of the accidental 
nature of the result must be measured by 
this knowledge. 
Kellogg v. California Western Life Ins. Co., 201 P.2d 949, 952 
{Utah 1949) • 
DATED this d_Q.f.h. day of July, 1982. 
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